Appendix to: Reluctant donors and their reactions to social information

[For online publication]

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This document provides additional analysis in support of the results in the main text. It also includes screenshots of the experiment and instructions.

Table A1 Treatment effects on the intent to donate

50¢-stage-2	0.210
	(0.222)
$5-stage-2	-0.152
	(0.189)
N	170
R^2	0.0235
p-value joint test for treatments	0.409

Notes: Coefficient estimates from a probit regression on the probability of accepting to donate in stage 1, restricting the sample to observations from treatments that did not show social information in stage 1, and controlling for the participant's age, gender, and pre-donation earnings. The last row shows the p-value of a chi-squared test of joint significance of the treatments. Standard errors clustered at the session level in parentheses. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

Table A2 Hurdle model showing effects of all treatments in the amount equation

	Probit Intent to Donate (1)	Hurdle Model (2)	OLS Donation Amount (3)
Panel A: Participation Decision (hundreds of a percentage point)			
50¢-stage-1	0.230***	0.238***	
	(0.064)	(0.063)	
$5-stage-1	-0.133***	-0.153***	
	(0.051)	(0.056)	
No info in stage 1 (mean)	0.359	0.348	
N	308	308	
Panel B: Amount Decision (USD)			
50¢-stage-1		0.155	
		(0.120)	
$5-stage-1		1.459***	
		(0.507)	
50¢-stage-2		0.215	0.243
		(0.147)	(0.188)
$5-stage-2		0.653***	0.600**
		(0.117)	(0.186)
No info in stage 2 (mean)		1.362	1.302
N		111	61

Notes: Treatment effects of the social information on the decisions of whether to donate and how much to donate. Column 1 shows effects from a probit regression of the probability of opting into stage 2, using as regressors the information in stage 1, controlling for age, gender, and pre-donation earninigs. Column 2 shows results from a lognormal hurdle model. Panel A of column 2 shows effects from the participation equation, which is a probit regression of the probability of donating a positive amount on the full sample, using as regressors the information in stage 1 and controlling for age, gender, and pre-donation earnings. Panel B of column 2 shows effects from the amount equation, which is a truncated regression of the donation size on the subsample of positive donations, using all treatments as regressors and controlling for age, gender, and pre-donation earnings. Column 3 shows effects from an OLS regression of the donation amount conditional on opting into stage 2 on the information in stage 2, on the subsample of treatments that did not provide information in stage 2. Standard errors clustered at the session level in parentheses. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

Table A3 Effect of the information in stage 1 on the intent to donate for the reluctant type

	(1)	(2)
50¢-stage-1	-0.765	-1.695
	(0.793)	(1.170)
$5-stage-1	0.654	1.918***
	(0.399)	(0.590)
Exit probability	-0.008	-0.008
	(0.006)	(0.008)
50¢-stage-1 x exit prob.	0.021**	0.034***
	(0.009)	(0.013)
$5-stage-1 x exit prob.	-0.016**	-0.027***
	(0.008)	(0.010)
Amount transferred	-0.117	
	(0.086)	
N	127	71

Notes: Coefficient estimates from probit regressions of the probability of opting into stage 2. In column 1, the sample is restricted to reluctant participants, and the regressors are the information in stage 1, the exit probability selected by the participant, the interaction of the two, and the amount transferred in the dictator game. In column 2, the sample is further restricted to reluctant participants who transferred at least $4 in the dictator game, and the regressors are the information in stage 1, the exit probability selected by the participant, and the interaction of the two. Both regressions control for age, gender, and pre-donation earnings. Standard errors clustered at the session level in parentheses. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

Table A4 Number of observations of positive donations across types for treatments with no information in stage 1

	Selfish	Reluctant	Generous
No-information	4	8	3
50¢-stage-2	8	13	4
$5-stage-2	5	12	3

Table A5 Effect of the information in stage 1 on the intent to donate, interacted with personality traits. Neuroticism is associated with being more likely to opt in in response to 50¢-stage-1, and being more likely to opt out in response to $5-stage-1, while no other personality trait is significantly predictive of a response to the information.

	(1)	(2)
50¢-stage-1	0.605***	0.583***
	(0.178)	(0.186)
$5-stage-1	-0.390***	-0.412**
	(0.135)	(0.184)
Neuroticism	0.044**	0.037
	(0.023)	(0.024)
Agreeableness	0.050**	0.022
	(0.021)	(0.022)
Extraversion	-0.027**	-0.026
	(0.013)	(0.017)
Openness	-0.002	-0.026
	(0.020)	(0.017)
Conscientiousness	0.018*	0.007
	(0.010)	(0.010)
50¢-stage-1 x Neuroticism	0.040**	0.055**
	(0.021)	(0.027)
$5-stage-1 x Neuroticism	-0.045*	-0.045*
	(0.024)	(0.025)
50¢-stage-1 x Agreeableness	0.035	0.052
	(0.039)	(0.038)
$5-stage-1 x Agreeableness	-0.020	-0.010
	(0.028)	(0.032)
50¢-stage-1 x Extraversion	0.007	0.008
	(0.019)	(0.020)
$5-stage-1 x Extraversion	0.010	0.010
	(0.022)	(0.029)
50¢-stage-1 x Openness	0.029	0.016
	(0.023)	(0.031)
$5-stage-1 x Openness	0.035	0.024
	(0.058)	(0.062)
50¢-stage-1 x Conscientiousness	0.005	0.011
	(0.019)	(0.016)
$5-stage-1 x Conscientiousness	0.015	0.014
	(0.031)	(0.031)
Principle of care controls	No	Yes
N	308	308

Notes: Coefficient estimates from probit regressions of the probability of opting into stage 2. Regressors are the information in stage 1, the demeaned average score in each of the five personality traits, and their interaction with the information (controlling for age, gender, and pre-donation earnings). Column 2 controls in addition for the score on each of the three principle of care dimensions. Standard errors clustered at the session level in parentheses. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.



Figure A1 Donation size conditional on intending to donate by treatment



Figure A2 Distribution of exit probabilities for the reluctant type

Experiment screenshots

Figure C1. Slider task.



Figure C2. Click task.

Figure C3. Solicitation Stage 1

Notes: In the treatments that provided information in Stage 1, the following sentence was added immediately below the NO/YES radio button: "For your information, a participant in a previous session donated [X]."

Figure 4C. Solicitation Stage 2
Notes: In the treatments that provided information in Stage 2, the following sentence was added immediately below the second line (information about min and max that could be donated): "For your information, a participant in a previous session donated [X]."

Experiment instructions

[REAL EFFORT TASKS]
Instructions

Welcome to this experiment on decision making. The other people in this room are also participating in the experiment. Please refrain from talking with them during the session. If you have any questions, please raise your hand and the experimenter will come to where you are to answer it in private.

In this experiment you will be able to earn money by completing two tasks in the computer for five rounds. You will receive the money that you earn in private and in cash at the end of the experiment.

All your actions in this experiment are anonymous, and are made through the computer. No other participant will see your actions.

Task 1
For Task 1 you will have 90 seconds to slide seven scroll bars to their center positions. An example of one scroll bar at two different positions is shown below.

The number to the right of the scroll bar indicates the current position of the scroll bar. This number goes from 0 to 100. As you slide the scroll bar this number changes. You have successfully positioned the scroll bar at the center when the number becomes 50.

For Task 1 you have 90 seconds to slide seven scroll bars to their center positions. You earn $1.50 if you successfully slide the seven scroll bars to their center, and $0 otherwise.

After the 90 seconds are up, you will move to Task 2.

Task 2
For Task 2 you will be asked to click a button at a precise second. On the screen you will see a timer displaying the seconds elapsed since the start of Task 2, and next to the timer you will see a button labeled with the number '15.' You must press this button precisely when the timer reads '15'—not before, nor after. You earn $1.50 if you successfully press the button exactly when the timer reads 15, and $0 otherwise.

Rounds
After finishing Task 1 and Task 2, the round ends, and a new round begins. The experiment consists of five identical rounds. For every task that you complete successfully you earn $1.50, so that you can earn up to $3 in a round. Your total earnings are the sum of your earnings from each of the five rounds.

[DICTATOR-EXIT GAME]

Instructions - Extra round

At the beginning of this round, the computer will randomly assign you either the color BLUE or the color GREEN, and will randomly pair you with a participant in this room of the other color to form a BLUE-GREEN pair.

For this round both you and the participant paired with you will make 2 decisions: Decision 1 and Decision 2. Your payment in this round will depend on the decisions made by you or by the participant paired with you.

Only one decision from only one member of the pair will count for payment. After everyone makes the two decisions, the experimenter will randomly select a color (BLUE or GREEN) and a decision (1 or 2) to be the decision that counts.

Your payment from this round will be added to the money you have already earned from the previous rounds.

Instructions for Decision 1 appear on the next screen. Instructions for Decision 2 will be given once everybody completes Decision 1.

Press OK to move to the instructions for Decision 1.

Decision 1
For this decision you must choose how to allocate $10 between you and the participant paired with you. You may choose any allocation that sums to $10 and that consists of whole numbers. In other words, you may choose any of the following allocations:

You:	$10	$9	$8	$7	$6	$5	$4	$3	$2	$1	$0
Other participant:	$0	$1	$2	$3	$4	$5	$6	$7	$8	$9	$10

As you privately make this decision, the participant paired with you will also privately make a decision by choosing from the same set of allocations.

Payment

If Decision 1 is randomly chosen as the decision that counts for payment, and your color is randomly chosen, then the allocation that you select in Decision 1 will be implemented. The money that you allocate to yourself will be paid to you, and the money that you allocate to the participant paired with you will be paid to that participant.

On the other hand, if Decision 1 is randomly chosen as the decision that counts for payment, and your color is not the one randomly chosen, then the allocation that the participant paired with you selects in Decision 1 will be implemented. The money that that participant allocates to you will be paid to you, and the money that that participant allocates to him or herself will be paid to that participant.

Remember that all decisions are private, and will never be linked to your identity.

Press OK to see what color you've been assigned, and then move to Decision 1.

Decision 2

Decision 2 involves two possible allocations of money between you and the participant paired with you. Allocation A is the allocation that you selected in Decision 1. Allocation B is $9 for you and $0 for the participant paired with you. Below you see these two allocations.

	You	Participant paired with you	
A	$9	$0	
B	$$	$$	←Your Decision 1

The computer will choose one of these two allocations as your allocation for Decision 2. It will make the choice based partly on chance, and partly on a number that you must indicate. The rule that the computer will use when choosing between A and B can be illustrated as follows.

The computer will place 100 balls in a bag, and will randomly draw one ball from the bag. Balls are labeled either A or B. The letter on the ball drawn by the computer determines whether allocation A or allocation B is chosen.

Your task in Decision 2 is to indicate to the computer how many of the 100 balls in the bag you want to be "B" balls. You can indicate any number between 10 and 90.

Once you indicate the number of B balls you want in the bag, the computer will place the desired number of B balls in the bag, and the remaining as A balls to complete 100 balls. It will then draw one ball, and the letter on the ball drawn will be your allocation for Decision 2.

Of course the computer will not literally use balls and a bag, but the algorithm is the same. The number that you indicate is therefore the probability with which the computer chooses allocation

B. 100 minus the number that you indicate is the probability with which the computer chooses allocation A.

Notice that because the number that you indicate must be between 10 and 90, there are always at least 10 balls of each letter in the bag, and therefore there is always some chance that the computer chooses either allocation regardless of what number you indicate.

Payment

After the computer chooses between allocation A and allocation B for Decision 2, you will learn which allocation the computer chose.

If Decision 2 is randomly chosen as the decision that counts for payment, and your color is randomly chosen, then your allocation for Decision 2 will be implemented. The money allocated to yourself will be paid to you, and the money allocated to the participant paired with you will be paid to that person.

On the other hand, if Decision 2 is randomly chosen as the decision that counts, and your color is not the one randomly chosen, then the allocation for Decision 2 of the participant paired with you will be implemented. The money allocated to you will be paid to you, and the money allocated that participant will be paid to that participant.

Remember that all decisions are private, and will never be linked to your identity.